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The Epidemic of Residential

Mortgage Fraud

BY JAMES CHARLES SMITH, THE HOLDER OF THE MARTIN CHAIR OF LAW

M

ortgage fraud consists of dishonest conduct, engaged in
by a borrower or another person prior to the funding of
a loan, that impairs the value of the loan.
This crime has exploded during the past decade, and reports
to the federal government of suspected fraud have risen by a
magnitude of more than 20 times from 2000 to 2010.
Between 2000 and 2007, mortgage fraud was a key
contributor to the unprecedented growth of toxic mortgage assets,
which led to the implosion of the subprime lending market.
One might think the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble,
with falling housing prices and the tightening of mortgage loan
underwriting standards since 2007, would result in a significant
reduction in the amount of fraud; but this has not happened.
In fact, the distress in the U.S. housing sales market has proven
to be fertile ground for mortgage fraud, with reported incidents
of fraud continuing to rise notwithstanding the overall decline in
the number of sales of residences and new mortgage loans.
New market conditions have led some perpetrators of fraud
to develop new schemes and to modify older ones, and reported
mortgage fraud increased 7 percent from 2008 to 2009.
www.law.uga.edu

Mortgage fraud is presently the
number one white-collar crime in the
United States, with the losses for 2009
estimated to be in the range of $15 to
$25 billion.

Mortgage Fraud Schemes
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
defines mortgage fraud as “the
intentional misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission by
an applicant or other interested parties, relied on by a lender or
underwriter to provide funding for, to purchase, or to insure a
mortgage loan.”
Mortgage fraud resembles predatory lending in that both refer
to tainted residential mortgage loans, but with predatory lending
the wrongdoer and victim are switched. Predatory lending refers
to improper behavior by the lender or by persons acting for the
lender that results in a loan with terms that victimize the borrower
with unfavorable loan terms.
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During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the federal
Nevertheless, the two phenomena tend to occur in the same
geographical communities, which are experiencing a lack of
government adopted reforms that radically transformed monetary
neighborhood stability due to factors such as high rates of market
policy, the banking system and the operation of credit markets.
sales, high foreclosure rates and high vacancy rates.
The federal reforms had two major consequences for mortgage
Mortgage fraud consists of two main types – “fraud for
markets. First, the Federal Housing Administration, and later
property” and “fraud for profit.”
the Veterans Administration, insured long-term loans (20 to 30
Fraud for property occurs when a loan applicant intentionally
years) with much smaller requirements for down payments than
overstates his income or misrepresents other relevant facts for the
previously required by private lenders. Interest rates were fixed for
purpose of purchasing a property to occupy as a residence. Usually
the loan duration, with monthly payments fully amortizing the
this scheme involves the purchase of a single property, with the
loan principal.
borrower taking possession at closing and intending to make
A second consequence was the development of national,
regular monthly payments thereafter.
standardized terms and documentation, which originating lenders
Often, fraud for property goes undetected for a long time
had to use to qualify for the FHA and VA programs.
period. If the borrower never defaults, the lender does not incur an
Under the FHA and VA programs, the mortgage lenders who
actual loss, and it is highly probable that the borrower’s fraud will
participated chiefly made loans in the local markets where they
never surface.
had a “bricks and mortar” presence.
Fraud for profit refers to a more complicated scheme in which
Geographical proximity between lenders and borrowers was
the fraudster’s purpose is to
epitomized by the lending operations of
Number of Violations of Mortgage Related Fraud
cause a lender to make a loan
the Bailey Building & Loan Association
and then escape with the
in the classic Jimmy Stewart movie, “It’s
Suspicious Activity Reports FY 2005-09
money. The idea is “take the
a Wonderful Life,” released in 1947.
FY 2005
FY 2006
FY 2007
FY 2008
FY 2009
money and run.”
This locally owned institution took
Often fraud for profit
deposits
from residents of Bedford
60,000
involves multiple transactions
Falls, which it recycled as capital by
and the use of one or
making home loans to other Bedford
40,000
more “industry insider”
Falls residents. Saving, lending and
intermediaries, such as a
borrowing were all geographically
20,000
corrupt mortgage broker, real
localized transactions.
estate appraiser or settlement
Locally based home lending,
0
agent. Identity theft is
engendering close proximity between
frequently one ingredient in
borrowers and residential mortgage
this type of wrongdoing.
lenders, began to wane during the late
Mortgage Fraud
Commercial Loan Fraud
False Statement
Fraud for profit accounts
1970s.
for a high percentage of mortgage fraud losses. Data collected by
Early the next decade, the federal government deregulated
the FBI reveals that “80 percent of all reported fraud losses involve
savings and loan associations, the backbone of home lending,
collaboration or collusion by industry insiders.”
allowing them to compete with financial institutions who offered
Flipping is a common fraud-for-profit technique. It occurs
newer financial products to customers.
when a property is sold multiple times between fake sellers and
At the same point in time, the secondary mortgage market
buyers at inflated prices to create the illusion of a market value
emerged, which allowed widespread sales of home mortgages
drastically higher than the property’s real value.
through pooling and securitization. Gradually lenders sold more
For example, a house worth $180,000 may be sold several
and more of the home mortgages they originated through the
times during a two-year period “on paper,” with the last sale
secondary mortgage market channels, so that by the 1990s it was
displaying a price of $400,000. Immediately after the last sale,
rare for lenders to eschew that market by keeping mortgages in
which is financed by an unsuspecting lender, the seller absconds
their own portfolios.
with the loan proceeds. Foreclosure results, causing a large loss –
Local mortgage loan origination followed by immediate sales
more than the usual loss stemming from a distressed sale – because
in the secondary mortgage market creates geographical distance
even with normal marketing, the property is worth far less than
between borrowers and lenders. Although the local originating
the value asserted in the appraisal submitted to the lender.
institution may retain the role of servicing the loan, the real owner
or owners of the loan (usually institutional investors) are located
in other communities, states and nations.
Another market change created further distance between the
Today, the typical relationship between a mortgage borrower
lender and borrower. Today, an increasing number of borrowers
and lender is characterized by geographical distance. This market
obtain their mortgage from out-of-town originators. From
characteristic began to develop during the 1970s and replaced
the standpoint of many borrowers, doing business with a local
“geographical proximity,” meaning the parties were situated in the
lender is not a priority. The main point is to obtain the required
community where the home was located.
mortgage money at the best terms (cheapest cost) possible.

Geographical Distance
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“The lack of fungibility of housing
values is a key ingredient that
allows many types of mortgage
fraud to succeed.”
A borrower may deal with a mortgage broker, who has
access to multiple foreign lenders; or a borrower may shop for
a mortgage loan directly, typically obtaining information and
submitting applications through the Internet.
The geographical distance created between lenders and
borrowers has substantially increased mortgage fraud risks for
lenders (including the ultimate purchasers of mortgage loans) for
two reasons.
First, today’s lender (or loan buyer) typically has had no direct
contact with the borrower and has no personal information
about the borrower. Unlike loans made by Bailey Building &
Loan, where George Bailey personally knew his customers,
today’s lender only possesses a name, a social security number
and a record prepared by third parties, such as credit reporting
agencies and appraisers.
Second, today’s lender typically has no direct, personal
knowledge about the collateral for the loan, i.e., the house.
With loans made by Bailey Building & Loan, the principals
and employees of the local lender knew their hometown,
Bedford Falls, and all the neighborhoods in which its customers
bought homes.
The lack of fungibility of housing values is a key ingredient
that allows many types of mortgage fraud to succeed.
A lender’s risk with respect to collateral value is reduced if the
collateral is one or more units of a standardized type of property,
which has a value that is readily determined by reference to
published market data.
For example, a secured loan collateralized by assets such as
gold (or other standardized commodities) or publicly traded
securities presents no real problem in assessing the market value
of the collateral at loan origination or on any other given date.
Similarly, determining the value of a typical automobile
for the purpose of making a car loan is not overly challenging,
given published guides listing estimated dealer and retail prices
based on standard variables such as mileage, accessories and
general condition.
In contrast, it is much harder to determine the value of
any particular dwelling unit, especially when the lender is at a
distance. This is why tainted appraisals are readily accepted by
originating lenders and by loan purchasers.
Consider, for example, one single-family house,
located in Atlanta, Ga., having four bedrooms and
two baths. Unless we acquire more information, it
is impossible to say what it may be worth. Location
and many other variables will determine that house’s
actual market value.
www.law.uga.edu

Transactional Distance
Parties to the traditional mortgage loan once had
“transactional proximity,” meaning the borrower and lender dealt
with one another directly with respect to the loan application and
most of the other requirements that had to be satisfied before the
lender funded the loan.
When necessary, the principals hired agents, but their roles
were circumscribed and their presence did not have the effect
of taking control of the transaction away from the principals or
reducing direct contact between the principals with respect to the
key elements of the contemplated loan transaction.
The secondary mortgage market began taking off during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, while the roles of third parties in
mortgage loan origination were also changing. Over time, these
intermediaries assumed new or expanded roles in facilitating
residential loans.
Transactional distance between the borrower and the lender
soon became the new norm. Today, most lenders and borrowers
have little direct contact as intermediaries separate and isolate the
principal parties.
These intermediaries, who sometimes serve as agents for
one or both of the parties and sometimes serve as non-agent
middlemen, include mortgage brokers, appraisers, closing
officers, title insurers, surveyors, credit reporting agencies and
participants in the secondary mortgage market.
Mortgage brokers function to eliminate direct contact
between lenders and buyers. Not only does the mortgage broker
select the lender, or select a small list of prospective lenders for
the borrower to consider, but the broker typically serves as the
conduit for all communication between the borrower and lender
until the closing of the loan.
Real estate appraisers perform the vital role of certifying as to
the market value of the house, which serves as the collateral for
the mortgage loan.

In relatively few cases, the borrower selects the appraiser.
Usually the originating lender picks the appraiser, and today the
appraiser is usually an intermediary rather than an “in house
appraiser” (an employee of the lender).
In principle, the appraiser’s duty to his principal (the lender)
should protect the lender from overestimating the value of the
collateral.
To the extent that the appraiser must exercise judgment
in reaching a professional opinion as to value, the appraiser
should estimate a conservative value, to assist the lender in
making sure that adequate collateral value will back the loan.
Ironically, however, the proximity between appraiser and
lender has generally failed to serve this purpose in modern
transactions.
Originating lenders make profits only if they originate
loans. They must originate high volumes of loans to obtain
significant profits.
During most of the past decade, lenders applied an
increasing amount of pressure on appraisers “to hit or exceed a
predetermined value.” Appraisers who failed to deliver sufficiently
high appraisals often lost business, with lenders shifting their
business to appraisers who would confirm the target values.
Closing practices have also evolved in the direction of
transactional distance. Closings were often held at the savings and
loan association or bank building, and even when closings were
held elsewhere, such as at a title company, an employee of the
lender often attended.
This gave the lender direct control over the closing and the
ability to approve all documentation and to deal with any lastminute changes or complications before parting with control over
the loan funds.
Nowadays, the norm is for an intermediary to close the loan,
acting pursuant to loan instructions issued by the lender. The
intermediary is usually a title company employee, an attorney or
an independent closing officer.
Most lenders have their loans closed by many different
individuals and, as a consequence, the lender usually cannot
acquire sufficient information to ascertain the quality of a
particular individual who closes its loans.
The pervasive use of all of the intermediaries or middlemen
who create transactional distance between borrowers and lenders
substantially adds to lender risk.
Not only are borrowers and lenders separated, but the lender
relies substantially on the work product of persons with whom
the lender generally has no significant prior and continuing
long-term relationship, and the lender has no objective reason to
believe the work is competent and meets professional standards
for quality.
The presence of many intermediaries in today’s transactions
enables mortgage fraud because fraudsters are able to corrupt
intermediaries in a sizeable number of transactions. Even when
an intermediary is not induced to prepare a record that he knows
to be false, a fraudster can exploit an intermediary – especially
one whose level of competence is minimal – by providing the
intermediary with false information, which the intermediary
turns into a record that appears to be fine on its face.
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Financial Distance
Parties to the traditional mortgage loan once had “financial
proximity,” meaning that the borrower and lender had significant
financial interests in the mortgage loan transaction. Both had and
kept “skin in the game.” Both had significant financial interests
after loan funding, which persisted until repayment of the loan at
maturity or by refinancing.
Lenders generally required the borrower to make a meaningful
down payment; thus, the borrower had an equity stake from day
one. The borrower’s equity gradually grew every month because
loan payments were set at an amount high enough to amortize the
loan principal.
By funding the loan, the originating lender acquired a
substantial financial asset. Prior to the development of the
secondary mortgage market, most originating lenders held the
large majority of the loans they made in their own portfolios.
Today, there are still many residential borrowers who have
substantial equity in their properties, but there are enormous
numbers of borrowers who have no equity (or negative equity) in
their homes.
Lenders began offering mortgage products with extremely small
down payment requirements – for example, conventional loans
with a 3 percent down payment.
More recently, 100 percent financing and mortgage loans that
allowed the borrower to finance closing costs by adding them to
the initial principal balance became common.
In addition, many newer loan products depart from the norm
of level amortization over the loan period. Interest-only loans,
which result in no amortization, and negative amortization loans,
in which payments during the first years of the loan were less than
the accrued interest, became increasingly popular.
During the past two decades, many lenders and borrowers, as
well as purchasers of mortgaged-backed securities, ignoring history,
have acted as if appreciation in home values is guaranteed and
always will have an upward slope to some degree.
Beginning in 2008, the U.S. housing bubble burst, with
substantial losses in housing values in virtually every community
in the nation. In the aggregate, U.S. homeowners lost close to $8
trillion of housing equity between the high-water mark for housing
prices, at the end of 2006, and the end of the first quarter of 2009.
Many owners who in fact had made significant down payments
when they bought homes found themselves with negative equity.
Such loans are said to be “underwater.” As of March 2009, 26
percent of homeowners with mortgage debt owed more than the
current value of their homes.

The Problem of Securitization
From the lender’s perspective, a key change involves the identity
of the real stakeholder and, perhaps more importantly, the manner
in which the investment is held.
Due to the securitization of loans through the secondary
mortgage market, few originating lenders retain a stake in the
loans they create. Instead, originators generate new capital
through securitization, selling their loans in the secondary
mortgage market.
www.law.uga.edu

A prime value of mortgage securitization is that from the
investor’s perspective, risk is diluted. Rather than owning entire
loans, an investor owns a beneficial interest in a pool containing
many loans, usually thousands. This hedges risk: A default by any
one borrower under any one loan has a small impact on the value
of the investor’s interest.
However, this raises a tragedy of the commons problem.
Although dilution of the percentage of beneficial ownership
has the benefit of hedging risk, at the same time it inevitably
reduces the incentive that an owning investor has with respect to
monitoring the performance of any single loan and, if the loan
becomes nonperforming, to intervening to
attempt to rectify the situation.
Furthermore, when there is a default
in a mortgage in a pool, the investor relies
solely upon the efforts of the loan servicing
firm and the issuer of the security. These
firms lack sufficient incentives to attempt
to restructure nonperforming loans.

Suggested Reforms

“Mortgage fraud has flourished
because the residential
mortgage market has adopted
institutions and practices
that create distance between
borrowers and lenders. ”

Mortgage fraud has flourished because
the residential mortgage market has
adopted institutions and practices that create distance between
borrowers and lenders.
To combat mortgage fraud, reforms should reduce that
distance. When it is not feasible to reduce distance, reforms
instead should seek to mitigate the risks associated with distance.
With respect to geographical distance, it is neither feasible nor
prudent to eliminate or drastically curtail the secondary mortgage
market, but other reform measures are possible.
A prime ingredient of mortgage fraud involves deception
of the lender as to the borrower’s true identity, accomplished
through identity theft, straw buyers or other means.
Loan closing practices generally consist of no more than
a notary public viewing a borrower’s driver’s license, typically
coupled with the borrower’s social security number being
displayed on a credit report and other loan-related documents.
Better closing procedures for verifying borrower identity could
include requiring the borrower’s birth certificate, an identity
card in addition to a driver’s license, copies of utility bills at
the borrower’s current or previous residence, and taking digital
photographs of borrowers and other closing participants.
The market could attach a “premium” to loans made by
community lenders to borrowers residing within their discrete
geographical market. Such loans bear less of a risk of mortgage
fraud and less risk generally.
The “premium” could be reflected by the price paid for
such loans in the secondary mortgage market. Such loans might
also properly bear a reduced mortgage insurance fee or one
commensurate with the reduced risk.
The proposal for attaching a “premium” to communitybank loans made to local borrowers will also serve to reduce
transactional distance because such loans will typically not be
made through a mortgage broker.
www.law.uga.edu

Another reform aimed at transactional distance is recasting the
lender-appraiser relationship. Under present practice, the lender
usually contracts with an independent appraiser or appraisal firm.
Lenders should be held liable for the work product of lenderhired independent appraisers to the same extent as if they were
employees.
This would extend liability to secondary market buyers
of loans who incur loss due to overstated appraisals when the
appraisal flaw is due to intentional misconduct or negligence.
Such a measure would significantly increase the incentive of
lenders to monitor appraiser behavior.
The third type of borrowerlender distance, financial distance,
represents the misalignment of
incentives to perform between the
borrower and originating lender.
Reforms on both sides of the lending
equation seem necessary.
So far, some attention has been
given to the borrower side, with
underwriting criteria reformed to
require some meaningful down
payment for virtually all borrowers.
Reforms are needed to give
originating lenders a sufficient, immediate interest in how the
loans they make perform after sale in the secondary mortgage
market.
The federal Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, enacted in 2010, requires the seller of mortgagebacked securities to retain at least 5 percent of the credit risk.
However, the 5 percent risk retention only applies to loans
classified by the lender as high risk, making it easy for the lender
to avoid the retention requirement.
More importantly, 5 percent is not nearly enough to
incentivize a lender not to make and sell “bad loans.” Recourse
liability should be much greater. If not “full recourse” (100
percent) which is common in commercial lending, at least much
more than 5 percent.
One potential weakness of a meaningful recourse rule is that
recourse is only as good as the solvency of the guarantor. As the
current financial crisis has demonstrated, many U.S. financial
institutions lack the cash reserves and capitalization to weather a
significant economic slump.
Accordingly, to serve as a meaningful incentive to avoid
originating weak loans, coupled with the imposition of recourse
liability, there would need to be assets set aside to cover some
percentage of the potential liability.

Conclusion
Mortgage fraud is relatively easy to perpetuate and likely will
always be present to some extent.
The mortgage lending process, however, can and should be
reformed to decrease the occurrence of tainted mortgage loans.
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